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Notes
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND GREATER
CONSUMER PROTECTION UNDER
WARRANTY LAW*
On March 28, 1958, the Kentucky Legislature adopted the 1957
Official Draft of the Uniform Commercial Code (hereafter referred
to as the Code), which became effective July 1, 1960.1 Kentucky thus
became the third jurisdiction2 to enact the comprehensive plan de-
signed to regulate all commercial transactions in a manner consistent
with modem trends and standards.3 The Code replaced, among other
statutes, the now outmoded Uniform Sales Act4 (hereafter referred
to as the Sales Act). Though the substance of most of the Sales Act
has been incorporated in Article 2 of the Code, it has been completely
rewritten with numerous revisions and many entirely new provisions.
The law of warranty received its share of Code changes, displaying its
growth and development during recent period of rapid industralization
and specialization.5 The reclassification as "express," of warranties
arising in sales by description and by sample, the broad definition of
merchantability, the codification of rules of disclaimer and the partial
settlement of the privity problem are but a few of the changes
reflecting a trend toward greater consumer protection.
The following comparison between the Sales Act and the Code,
with respect to warranty law, is divided into three main categories:
(1) the classification of warranties which may arise, (2) the manner
o Attention is directed to Note, "A Comparison of Rights and Remedies of
Buyers and Sellers under the Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform Sales
Act", 49 Ky. L.J. (1960), which includes a discussion of the remedies for breach
of warranty and the damages which are recoverable.
I Kentucky Acts 1958, Ch. 77.
2 Pennsylvania became the first state to adopt the Code by enacting the 1952
Official Draft, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit 12A §§ 1-101 to 10-104 (1954). Massachusetts
became the second jurisdiction by adopting the 1957 Official Draft in 1957. Mass.
Gen. Laws Ch. 106: 1-101 to 9-507 (1957). In 1959, Connecticut and New
Hampshire became the fourth and fifth jurisdictions to adopt the Code. Conn.
Gen. State. Rev. § 4 2a (Supp. 1959); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Ch. 382a (Supp.
1959).
3UCC § 1-102(2). Note that sections of the 1957 Official Draft of the
Uniform Commercial Code will be cited as UCC. Citations to the Official Com-
ments of the 1957 Official Draft will be cited by the Code section and the
official comment. The citations to the Uniform Sales Act and to the Kentucky
Revised Statutes will be given as USA and KRS respectively.
4USA §§ 1-79, KRS Ch. 361 (1928).
5 Llewellen, Cases and Materials on Sales 340-343 (1930).
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in which warranties may be disclaimed, and (3) the application of
warranties to third parties.6
Classification of Warranties
Warranties in general may be classified into three major categories:
Express, Implied and Statutory.
A. Express Warranties:
The express warranty has continued to gain in prominence and
the Code reflects this trend by broadening its coverage to transactions
which formerly were only within the bounds of implied warranties.
This extended coverage affords the buyer additional protection against
the disclaiming seller who seeks without the purchaser's consent to
limit his obligation under the sale or contract to sell.
The express warranty was narrowly defined under the Sales Act as:
Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the
goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirma-
tion or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if
the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon. No affirmation of the
value of the goods nor any statement purporting to be a statement
of the seller's opinion only shall be construed as a warranty.7
Where the Sales Act limited the express warranty only to affirmations
of fact or promises of the seller which have a natural tendency to
duce the buyer to purchase the goods in reliance thereon, the Code
has extended the application of the express warranty to sales by
description and to sales by sample or model." The Code also sub-
stitutes the phrase "part of the basis of the bargain",9 in place of the
words "natural tendency" and "purchasers . . .relying thereon" used
in the Sales Act provision set out above. This is apparently in line
with the interpretation of the warranty by the courts under the Sales
0 For a similar comparison under Pennsylvania law, see Note, "Legislation,"
15 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 831 (1953-54).7 USA § 12, KRS § 361.120 (1928).
8UCC § 2-313 (1) provides:
Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or
promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basic of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform
to the sample or model. [Emphasis added.]
0 ibid.
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Act where the seller's intention to warrant was not required.10 No
specific intention to warrant the goods is necessary under the Code,
if an affirmation of fact, promise, description, sample, or model are
made part of the basis of the bargain.1 "Basis of the bargain" is more
inclusive since it is an objective standard, looking at the dickered
aspects and the individual terms, while the "natural tendency" test
under earlier cases provided an escape to the seller by showing that
the affirmations made were not normally considered to induce the
reliance of the buyer in purchasing the goods.
Warranties arising from sales by description and by sample are
classified as implied warranties under the Sales Act, obligating the
seller only to the extent of supplying goods which reasonably conform
to the description, 2 or in the case of sale by sample suppling
bulk in reasonable conformity with the sample.13 The failure of the
of the Sales Act to allow for an express warranty in sales by description
met with the criticism of Professor Williston,' 4 the principal drafter
Sales Act to allow for an express warranty in sales by description
affirmation of fact and descriptive language used in identifying the
goods in the sales contract. He expressed the belief that such
descriptive language may be enforced as an express warranty arising
by affirmation of fact. The drafters of the Code were cognizant of
the problem, and left no room for ambiguity by creating an express
warranty under section 2-313 in all sales involving a description or
descriptive language.
The Code provision concerning the wararnty arising out of a sale
by sample is more stringent from the seller's standpoint than its
predecessor under the Sales Act. Instead of reasonable conformity
of the bulk. 5 the whole must conform to the sample under the Code.16
In creating an express warranty where the sale is by sample, the Code
follows the reasoning that the sample is the equivalent of a description
of the existing bulk.'7
101 Williston, Sales § 201 (rev. ed. 1948). See also McClintock v. Emich,
Stoner & Co., 87 Ky. 160, 7 S.W. 903 (1888), a pre-Sales Act determination that
specific intent to warrant was not necessary.
11UCC § 2-313 (2) provides in part:
It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the
seller use formal words such as "warrant" or -guarantee" or that he
have a specific intention to make a warranty.... See UCC § 2-313,
official comment 3.
12 USA § 14, KRS 361.140 (1928).
13USA § 16(a), KRS 361.160(a) (1928).
14 1 Williston Sales § 223 (rev. ed. 1948).
15USA § 16(a), KRS 361.160(a) (1928). See also Sachs Shoe Co. v. Mays-
ville S. & D. Goods Co. 201 Ky. 239, 256 S.W. 401 (1923).
16 UCC § 2-313(1) (c); UCC § 2-313, official comment 6.
17Vold, Sales § 88 (2d ed. 1959).
[Vol. 49,
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In conjunction with the warranty by sample, the Code creates a
new warranty arising out of sales by model.' 8 Though a model is
similar to a sample, it is distinguishable in that a sample is a unit of
an existing mass, while the model is merely representative of either
existing goods or goods to be produced in the future.19
An express warranty does not depend upon express language such
as "I warrant or guarantee" for its existence.20 This principle was well
settled in Kentuckfiy prior to the adoption of the Sales Act2 ' and the
Code has followed in the same tradition. The Code also contains the
proposition that no warranty arises where the seller is merely making
a value judgment or stating an opinion.22 This rule has forced the
courts to distinguish between a seller's affirmation of fact which
induces the buyer and becomes part of the basis of the bargain, and
a statement which is merely an opinion of the seller. The Kentucky
Court of Appeals adopted the generally followed test in Wedding v.
Duncan,28 i.e.:
[W]hether the seller assumes to assert a fact of which the buyer is
ignorant, or whether he merely states an opinion or expresses a judg-
ment about a thing as to which they may each be expected to have
an opinion.24
This test will have continued application under the Code in aiding the
courts in determining whether the statement of the seller became
part of the basis of the bargain or whether it was merely an opinion
upon which the buyer could not have relied. However, the test above
would not be conclusive; though the buyer has the skill and judgment
necessary to make an opinion of his own, there may still be reliance
upon the seller's opinion which induced or, at least, was one of the
inducements leading to the sale. Williston urges that if the statement
was made to induce the sale and does so in fact, the seller should be
held to have expressly warranted the goods.25
B. Implied Warranties:
Professor Vold defines implied warranties as warranties imposed
by law because of tacit representations or broader considerations of
policy.28 There are three classifications of implied warranties under
18UCC § 2-313(1)(c).
19 UCC § 2-313, official comment 6.
2OUCC J 2-313(2).
2
1 McClintock v. Emich, 87 Ky. 160, 7 S.W. 903 (1888).
22 UCC § 2-313(2).
28310 Ky. 374, 220 S.W. 2d 564 (1949).
24 Id. at 378, 220 S.W. 2d at 567. See 1 Williston, Sales § 202 (rev. ed.
1948).
25 1 Williston, Sales § 202 (rev. ed. 1948).
25 Vold, Sales § 84 (2d ed. 1959).
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the Code; the warranty of merchantability, the warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose, and warranties which arise by usage of trade
or course of dealing. In the case of implied warranties, the Code is
more inclusive than the Sales Act, granting broader, more complete
protection in a greater number of transactions, enabling the buyer to
rely with greater assurance upon the representations, selections and
reputation of the seller.
1. Implied Warranty of Merchantability:
The warranty of merchantability represents perhaps one of the
most significant changes made by the Code. The Code warranty of
merchantability replaces the undefined and restricted warranty which
the Sales Act imposed on the seller only in sales by description
7
or sample.28 Section 2-814 (1) of the Code provides:
Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if
the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under
this section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed
either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
The Code warranty is broad and comprehensive arising out of every
sale where the seller is a merchant unless excluded or modified in
a manner to be discussed hereinafter.29 A merchant is defined as
"a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his
occupation holds himself out as having the knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices.. . ."3o Though section 2-814 is restricted to
sales by merchants, the comments suggest that it will have further
influence upon the courts in treatment of the occasional non-merchant
sellers who expressly state that the goods are warranted or guaranteed.
Such language on the part of the non-merchant would imply that he
is warranting the goods to be of merchantable quality.
3'
The long disputed issue of whether the sale of food to be consumed
on the premises constituted a sale under which the seller could be
liable for breach of warranty was conclusively settled by the Code.
27 USA § 15(2); KRS 361.150(2) (1928).
28USA § 16(c); KRS 361.160 (3) (1928).
29 UCC § 2-314, official comment 2 states:
The responsibility imposed rests on any merchant-seller, and the
absence of the words "grower or manufacturer or not" which appeared
in section 15(2) of the Uniform Sales Act does not restrict the
applicability of this section.
30 UCC § 2-104.
31 UCC § 2-314, official comment 4. The words "I warrant" would create
an express warranty that the goods are merchantable and as the comment suggests;
§ 2-314 of the Code will furnish the courts with a guide to measure the warranty
given.
[Vol. 49,
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Whether the food be consumed on the premises or taken elsewhere, it
will be for the purposes of the warranty of merchantability a sale of
goods and not a furnishing of services with the sale of food being
only incidental.32 In a Kentucky decision, Snead v. Waite,33 where
food prepared for immediate consumption had been taken to the
purchaser's home and consumed by the members of his family, all of
whom became violently ill, the court permitted recovery under the
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, signifying that the sale
of food constitutes a sale of goods fit for the particular purpose of
human consumption. The Kentucky rule is that the seller of food,
whether the food is open for inspection,34 or in a sealed container,
3
5
warrants the goods fit for the particular purpose of human consump-
tion. Refusing to construe the sale of food products as a sale by descrip-
tion, the courts resorted to a legal fiction. It was found that the buyer
had made known his purpose and he purchased in reliance upon the
skill and judgment of the seller, thus qualifying under the warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose.3 6 This fiction need no longer be
resorted to under the Code since the warranty of merchantability is
applicable in all sales of food.
37
The term "merchantability" has long been troublesome to the
courts.38 The Code in meeting this problem sets out what is thought
by many authorities to be the best existing definition,3 9
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description; and
(b) In the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality
within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of
even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among
all units involved; and
32 UCC § 2-314, official comment 5; Vold, Sales § 94 (2d ed. 1959).
33306 Ky. 587, 208 S.W. 2d 749 (1948).
4 Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Eiseman, 259 Ky. 103, 81 S.W. 2d 900 (1935).
35 Martin v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 801 Ky. 429, 192 S.W. 2d 201 (1946).
3 When a buyer purchases food, the seller has reason to know that it is for
human consumption. The buyer relies on the skill and judgment of the seller
in furnishing products from which the purchaser might choose.
37 Non-food cases in which both goods and services are furnished have
plagued the courts. In Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123
N.E. 2d 792 (1954), the New York Court of Appeals ruled that the furnishing
of diseased blood for which the plaintiff, patient, was charged did not constitute
a sale, but was only incidental to the main function of the hospital.38 Llewellen, "On Warranty of Quality, and Society; II; 37 Colum. L. Rev.
341, 883 (1937).
89 Vold, Sales § 89 (2d. ed. 1959).
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(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the
agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on
the container or label if any.
40
Subsection (a) pertains to the particular standards of the trade or
business of the seller, suggesting that the goods pass without objection
under the contract of description. Like the standard of fair average
quality under subsection (b) which is particulary appropriate in
fungibles and agricultural bulk, each unit need not individually meet
the particular standard, but the goods as a bulk should conform to a
fair average quality around the mid-point of the class.41 Subsection
(c) is the fundamental concept behind the warranty of merchant-
ability in regard to recovery by the purchaser in personal injury suits.
42
The seller warrants that the goods be fit for the ordinary purposes for
which they were produced. However, this definition is not limited to
the personal injury suit, it is applicable to all classes of purchasers,
whether for resale or for final consumption, whether for recovery of
the value of the goods, or consequential damages due to personal
injuries sustained. Subsection (d) refers to the permissive variations
of quality within certain accepted limits as established by the terms
of the agreement or usage of trade.43 Subsection (e) is applicable
where special requirements demand that the goods be adequately
packaged and due to their nature they require certain types of
packaging, containers or labels. Subsection (f) is applicable wherever
the package or label contains an affirmation of fact.44
Under the Sales Act, in order that it be understood that the
warranty of merchantability arises in every sale by description, the
words "whether the seller be grower, manufacturer or not" are
employed. The omission of these words from the Code in no way
restricts or limits the application of the Warranty,45 for growers,
manufacturers and the like are clearly within the broad definition of
merchant set out above in Section 2-104 (1). From producer to
distributor, to wholesaler, to retailer and to the final consumer, all are
within the scope of the warranty. Unless it is excluded or modified
the purchaser has recourse against his immediate seller if the goods
40 UCC § 2-314(2). As is indicated by the use of the words "Must be at least
such as" and as expressed in official comment 6, the list is not meant to be
exhaustive, thus permitting the court to add to the list other attributes not
specifically set out in the Code.
41 UCC § 2-314, official comment 7.4 2 UCC § 2-314, official comment 8.
43 UCC § 2-314, official comment 9.
44 UCC § 2-314, official comment 10.
45 UCC § 2-314, official comment 2.
[Vol. 49,
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in question have fallen below the standards of merchantable quality
for which he has bargained.
2. Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose;
Under the Sales Act the warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose,40 perhaps more than any other warranty, has been relied on
by the injured purchaser in litigations against the seller. The warranty
arises in sales where the buyer makes known to the seller the particular
use to which he will put the goods and relies upon the seller's skill in
selecting suitable goods for the desired purpose.47 The seller's selection
of particular goods for that purpose amounts to a tacit representation
that the goods selected are suitable for the particular need of the
buyer.48 Thus, as in the case of the warranty of merchantability and
other implied warranties, this warranty arises by implication of law.
The Code roughly approximates the Sales Act warranty by pro-
viding,
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the
buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next
section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose. 49
Under the Sales Act it was clear that there were two essential
requirements: (1) that the buyer either expressly or by implication
made known the particular purpose to the seller and (2) that there
were apparent reliance on the seller's skill and judgment. The test was
said to be whether the buyer justifiably relied upon the seller's skill
and judgment that the goods furnished would fulfill the particular
need, or whether the buyer relied on his own judgment.50 However,
under the Code there is some ambiguity as to what actually is
required. There are at least three possible interpretations. First the
Code section may be read to require that the seller have reason to
know both the particular purpose and that the buyer is relying upon
the seller's skill and judgment with no actual reliance on the part of
the buyer being necessary. It may also be interpreted to mean that
the seller must have reason to know of the particular purpose and
that the buyer is actually relying on the seller's skill and judgment.
This interpretation is more consistent with that of the Sales Act. The
46 USA § 15(1), KRS 361.150(1) (1928).
47 Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Eiseman, 259 Ky. 103, 81 S.W. 2d 900 (1935).
48 Vold, Sales § 90 (2d ed. 1959).
49 UCC § 2-315.
50 1 Williston, Sales § 235 (rev. ed. 1948).
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official comments suggest still a third possibility: that the seller must
have reason to know the particular purpose, and must also have
reason to know of the buyer's reliance, in addition to the requirement
that the buyer must actually be relying on the seller.5 Since reliance
is of paramount concern to the courts, either the second or third
interpretation will most likely prevail.
The Code makes use of the phrase "seller has reason to know" while
the Sales Act imposed the burden on the buyer to make his particular
purpose known.52 While under the Sales Act it would seem that
some positive action on the part of the buyer is required, the Code,
engulfed in objectivity, requires only that the seller have reason to
know the particular purpose. It is also noted that the scope of the
warranty is extended by the Code and made applicable to the buyer
who relies on the seller's skill or judgment in either furnishing or
selecting goods suitable for the special needs of the buyer. The word
"furnish" covers the situations in which the goods are actually
supplied by the seller even though they may have been selected by the
buyer; while the word "select" implies that the goods are chosen by
the seller. Generally, the Sales Act warranty protected the buyer
only where the seller selected the goods, leaving in doubt situations
where the goods were furnished by the seller but chosen by the buyer
out of several choices made available.
53
The trade name exception in section 15 (4) of the Sales Act has
been abandoned by the Code.54 The official comments state that
purchases by trade name may still serve as evidence that there has
been no actual reliance on the part of the buyer;5  but where there is
knowledge of the particular purpose of the buyer and the seller selects
or recommends a product which he conveniently refers to by its trade
name, the warranty will arise even though sold by trade name, if
there has been the necessary reliance by the buyer.56 This is in line
with the existing Kentucky rule of refusing to apply the trade name
exception where the goods were purchased upon the recommendation
of the seller.5
7
A particular purpose is distinguishable from an ordinary purpose
in that the former envisages a specific use by the buyer peculiar to
his needs which may or may not be an ordinary use of the product
51 UCC § 2-315, official comment 1.
52 Ibid.
53 Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Eiseman, supra note 47; Louisville Grinding and
Mac. Co. v. Southern Oil & Tar Co., 230 Ky. 39, 18 S.W. 2d 377 (1929).
54 UCO § 2-315, official comment 5; Void, Sales § 90 at 441 (2d ed. 1959).
55 UCC § 2-315, official comment 5.
56 Ibid.
57 Halterman v. Louisville Bridge & Iron Co., 254 S.W. 2d 493 (1953).
[Vol. 49,
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selected or furnished.58 Since the warranty of merchantability arises
in every sale where the seller is a merchant there will often be two
warranties upon which to base the seller's liability 9 This results
wherever the seller selects goods which were designed for the buyer's
"special needs".
3. Warranties by Course of Dealing and Usage of Trade:
The Code provides for a third classification of implied warranties,
those which arise by course of dealings and usage of trade.60 The Code
reaffirms the position of Sales Act under which an implied warranty
or condition as to the quality or fitness for a particular purpose may
be annexed by usage of trade.0' The warranty imposes an obligation
on the seller to comply with certain standards of quality, fitness and
procedure which are by custom and usage employed in sales generally
or in that particular locality. The Kentucky Court of Appeals in-
terpreted the Sales Act warranty by usage as a warranty of fitness
for some special use which is established by general habit or custom
of the using public in that particular locality.62 However, the court
has restricted its application by refusing to incorporate the warranty
into the contract unless it is clear that the seller against whom it is
to be used was aware of its existence.63 No apparent change has been
made with respect to the warranty by usage, and the courts will
continue to apply the same standards as were applicable under the
Sales Act.
A warranty may also arise by course of dealing. A course of
dealing relates to prior contractual relations between the two parties. 4
Where the parties have engaged in a course of business over a period
of time, certain formalities are often abandoned and certain obligations
are mutually understood by both parties. Though such obligations
have not been expressly included in the contract, the Code will give
effect to the terms under the theory of an implied warrantly by course
of dealing.
C. Statutory Warranty of Title and Against Infringements:
Warranties of title, against incumbrances, and of quiet enjoyment
were provided as implied obligations of the seller under the Sales Act. 5
5s UCC § 2-315, official comment 2.
50 Ibid.
00 UCC § 2-314(3) rovides:
Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties
may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
061 USA 15(5), KRS 361.150(5) (1928).
62 North Am. Fertilizer Co. v. Combs, 307 Ky. 869, 212 S.W. 2d 526 (1948).
03 Caldwell Hunter & Co. v. Dawson, 61 Ky. (4 Mete.) 121 (1862).
04 UCC § 1-205 (1).
65 USA § 13, KRS 361.130 (1928).
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The warranty assures the good faith purchaser that the title he
receives is good and free from all incumbrances except those of which
he may have actual knowledge, and that he will not be exposed to a
lawsuit.6s Even prior to the adoption of the Sales Act, the courts
recognized the implied warranty of title arising out of the seller's tacit
representation that the goods in his possession which he offered for
sale were his own.
67
In the pre-Sales Act era, there was some question as to when a
cause of action accrued and when the statute of limitation would
begin to run. Some jurisdictions held that the statute ran from the
time of the sale, at which time the warranty was breached, while
others have found that there had been no breach until there was a
disturbance of quiet possession by one holding a superior claim to
the goods.08 The Sales Act codified both positions by providing that
the warranty of title and the warranty against incumbrances were
breached at the time of the sale, while the warranty of quiet enjoy-
ment was not breached until the disturbance of the peaceful posses-
sion.69
Several material changes are made by the comparable Code pro-
vision. 70 The Code makes allowance only for the warranties of title
and against incumbrances, indicating the modem view that the war-
ranty is breached at the time of delivery and that the seller's obligation
should only extend for the normal period of limitations, four years.71
Though the warranty of quiet possession is abolished by the Code, the
comments provide that a disturbance of peaceful possession is one of
many ways in which a breach of the warranty of title may be estab-
lished.72 Again a Code section has met with the ardent criticism of
Professor Williston, who feels it grossly unjust for an innocent pur-
chaser to lose his property after holding it for longer than the four year
period. After the running of the statute of limitations the purchaser
66 1 Williston, Sales § 218. (rev. ed. 1948).
67 Ibid.; Vold, Sales § 87 (2d ed. 1959).
68 1 Williston, Sales § 221 (rev. ed. 1948); Vold, Sales § 87 (2d ed. 1959).
69 Ibid.
7oUCC § 2-812(1) provides:
Subject to subsection (2) there is in a contract for sale a warranty
by the seller that
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful: and
(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security interest or
other lien or encumbrance of which the buyer at the time of
contracting has no knowledge.
71 UCC § 2-725. Note the change in the statute of limitations from five to
four years.
72 UCC § 2-312, official comment 1.
[Vol. 49,
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in good faith is barred from any recovery against the seller.73 The
rareness of such suits offsets the damaging effects of the omission.74
of the goods which they sell are expressly excluded from the bounds
of the warranty obligation.75 The Code follows the tradition of the
Sales Act in limiting the application of the section where the person
professes to sell, by virtue of authority in fact or law, goods in which
a third person has a legal or equitable interest.
76
The Sales Act made no provision for a warranty against infringe-
ment of patent rights, trade-marks or copyrights. However there is
some authority for bringing an action for breach of such warranty.
77
Since the right to convey is incidental to ownership, where a sale of
the goods would infringe upon the rights of third persons, the seller
does not have sufficient ownership to meet the demands of the
warranty of title. The Code specifically provides that:
Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a merchant regularly dealing
in goods of the kind warrants that the goods shall be delivered free
of the rightful claim of any third person by way of infringement or
the like but a buyer who furnishes specifications to the seller must
hold the seller harmless against any such claim which arises out of
compliance with the specifications.
78
Classed neither as an express warranty nor as one imposed by implica-
tion of law, the warranty of title and against infringements is deemed
to be a statutory warranty and arises in all sales (unless otherwise
agreed) where the seller is a merchant dealing in such goods.79 It places
on the seller the burden on the seller of furnishing goods which do
not infringe upon the rights of third persons.80 The seller will, how-
73 Williston, "The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code,"
63 Harv. L. ev. 561, 578 (1950).
74 Note, "Legislation," 15 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 330 (1953-54).
Certain sellers who by their nature do not profess to be the owners
75 USA § 13(4), KRS 361.130(4) (1928).7 0UCC § 2-312(2) provides:
A warranty under subsection (1) will be excluded or modified only
by specific language or by circumstances which give the buyer
reason to know that the person selling does not claim title in himself
or that he is purporting to sell only such right or title as he or a
third person may have.77 R1obertson, "Implied Warranties of Non-Infringement," 44 Mich. L. Rev.
933 (1946). He urges Adoption of the Uniform Revised Sales Act which
expressly provides for the warranty against infringement.
78UCC § 2-312(3).
70 Kentucky Legislative Research Commission Bulletin No. 49 § 2-312 com-
ment 1 (1957); Collins, "Warranties of Sale Under Uniform Commercial Code," 42
Iowa L. Rev. 63, 66 (1956).
hCollins, "Warranties of Sale under Uniform Commercial Code," supra note
79. Rev. 63, 66 (1956).
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ever, be absolved from liability where he is furnished exact specifica-
tions, the following of which necessarily infringes the rights of others.
The buyer is held to indemnify the seller and assumes all liability.81
Exclusion and Modification of Warranties:
Having examined the various warranties under the Code, and the
circumstances under which they will be incorporated into the contract
of sale, we must realize that other terms of the contract may provide
for the exclusion or modification of these various warranties which
otherwise may have arisen.
A. Express Warranties:
The express warranty has maintained a preferred position in
warranty law due to the general ineffectiveness of words of dis-
claimer.82 However, even an express warranty may be excluded or
modified, in certain instances. Where the Sales Act had failed to
codify the rules of disclaimer, the Code devotes an entire section to
this purpose. Section 2-316 (1) states:
Words of conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty
and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but
subject to the provisions of the Article on parol or extrinsic evidence
(Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent
that such construction is unreasonable.
The parol or extrinsic evidence rule recognizes that terms of the
agreement which are set forth in a sales memorandum or writing,
which is intended to represent a final expression of the agreement of
the parties, may not be contradicted by evidence of a prior agreement
or of a contemporaneous oral agreement.83 The Code further relates
that in the absence of language indicating that the written contract
is the complete agreement containing all the terms, the writing may
be supplemented or explained by evidence of additional consistent
terms, and by usage of trade, course of dealing and course of per-
formance.84 Thus, although the "disclaimer" is ineffective as against
express warranties contained in the agreement, an "entirety" clause
stating that the contract contains all the terms agreed upon will
effectively prevent claims of other express warranties made orally prior
to the writing.
The parol evidence rule contained in the Code is consistent with
81UCC § 2-312, official comment 3; Vold, Sales § 87 (2d ed. 1959).
82 Vold, Sales § 91 (2d ed. 1959).
83 UCC § 2-202; Vold, Sales § 92 (2d ed. 1959). Parol evidence of promis-
sory warranties in connection with the terms of an integrated written contract to
sell is inadmissible.
84 UCC § 2-202.
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Kentucky decisions. In Grayson Motor Sales, Inc. v. Shannon,85 the
court ruled in effect that a written disclaimer in a contract of sale
providing that the only warranty expressed or implied was to be the
manufacturer's warranty, effectively excluded the oral representation
of the used car dealer as to the condition of the car.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in
Hopkinsville Motor Co. v. Massie,8 where the seller of a tractor made
oral representations concerning the quality of his product, but in the
contract of sale expressly stated that "there was no warranty either
express or implied". The court upheld the disclaimer stating that
"... parties competent to contract may contract as they please just
so their agreement is not forbidden ... "87 However the court made
the distinction between affirmations of fact made in negotiating the
sale and those made in the actual contract. Professor Williston has
supported this view. He states that parties may limit the effectiveness
of language which would otherwise bring about the existence of an
express warranty. He adds that the Sales Act provides that rights,
duties and liabilities may be negated by express agreement.
88
The 1952 draft of the Uniform Commercial Code, adopted by
Pennsylvania, expressly provides that there can be no exclusion or
modification of express warranties.8 9 This old orthodox view has
enabled the express warranty to maintain its preferred position. How-
ever, it is unrealistic and contrary to the parol evidence rule as well
as to general contract principles. The 1957 version of the Code adopted
in Kentucky is in agreement with the Kentucky rule and Professor
Williston and is consonant with the fundamental maxim that parties
are free to contract as they please. It is also consistent with modem
contract law which examines the contract or transaction as a whole
giving the terms a reasonable construction consistent with each other
wherever possible. 90 But where such a construction is not reasonable,
the specific terms must prevail over the general; the express warranty
must prevail over the inconsistent words of disclaimer where both
are contained in the same instrument.
B. Exclusion or Modification of Implied Warranties:
In the absence of specific statute, the courts have permitted modi-
fication or exclusion of implied warranties where the seller has used
85 322 S.W. 2d 465 (Ky. 1959).
80 228 Ky. 569, 15 S.W. 2d 423 (1929).
87 Id. at 571, 15 S.W. 2d at 424.
88 1 Williston, Sales § 213 (1948); see USA § 71, KRS 361.710 (1928).
89 UCC § 2-316 (1952 Official Draft); Penn. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 A § 2-316
(1954).90 Restatement, Contracts § 236 (1932).
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specific language of modification or exclusion, which language has
been brought to the attention of the buyer.9' The Kentucky Court of
Appeals made its position clear in Whayne Supply Co. v. Gregory
9 2
by stating that under the Sales Act a warranty will not be implied
where the contract has expressly stipulated against it or has declared
that no warranty other than those set forth in the contract exists.
However, in light of the fact that implied warranties are imposed by
law to permit the parties to bargain at arms length, and further to
impose the burden on the seller of improving the marketability of
goods, the courts have given words of disclaimer a rather strict
interpretation,93 even when the words relate only to implied war-
ranties. The problem most often arises in relation to words tending
to exclude the warranty of merchantability.94 i.e., where the seller
wishes to absolve himself of liability which may result from the sale
of goods of inferior quality. The courts have been aware of the fine
print disclaimer which is known to the buyer, and have made it
ineffectual. On the other hand, there is admittedly a need for a
merchant to be able to dispose of such goods without liability. The
problem of drafting a suitable phrase, which clearly makes the seller's
position understood and would be given effect by the courts, has
represented an intriguing challenge to the commercial lawyer.95
Cognizant of the lack of uniformity in handling phrases of disclaimer,
the Code expressly sets out the manner by which the warranty of
merchantability may be disclaimed. Section 2-316(2) provides:
Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty
of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous .... 90
By virtue of these requirements, the Code protects the buyer from
the surprise disclaimer97 and strives to limit the use of the disclaimer
to cases where the clear intent of the parties demonstrates that the
warranty does not exist.
The warranty of fitness for a particular purpose poses a lesser
problem, because it arises only where the seller has reason to know
of a particular purpose, and that the buyer is relying on his skill and
judgment, and where the buyer actually relies upon the selection of
the seller.98 Section 2-316(2) continues:
9 1 Broucher & Sutherland, Commercial Transactions 16 (2d ed. 1958).
92 291 S.W. 2d 885 (Ky. 1956); see also Myers v. Land, 314 Ky. 514, 235
S.W. 2d 988 (1951).
93 Vold, Sales § 91 (2d ed. 1959).
94 1 Williston, Sales § 289 (rev. ed. 1948).
95 Ibid; Vold, Sales § 91 (2d ed. 1959).
96UCC § 2-316(2).
97 UCC § 2-316, official comment 1.
98 UCC § 2-315.
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... to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion
must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all
implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that
"There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the
face hereof. [Emphasis added.]
Here we find that the disclaimer must be a conspicuous writing.
Unlike the warranty of merchantability which may be orally dis-
claimed, the Code requires a written disclaimer with regard to the
warranty of fitness whether or not other terms of the contract are in
writing.
Several inconsistencies appear in the above section of the Code.
The use of the words "all implied warranties of fitness" may indicate
both fitness for a particular purpose and fitness for the ordinary
purposes for which the goods were produced, the latter being the
principle definition of the warranty of merchantability.99 It would
appear that the approach which should be taken by the courts is to
read into the section the additional words "for a particular purpose",
requiring the seller to exclude both warranties individually where
such is his clear intention.
Aside from the general rules of disclaimer set out above in section
2-816 (2) there are certain well known exceptions to the rules which
by custom and usage have been common practice in commercial
circles. The Code sets out these exceptions in section 2-316 (3) as
follows:
Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied war-
ranties are excluded by expressions like "as is", "with all faults"
or other language which in common understanding calls the
buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain
that there is no implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined
the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has
refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with
regard to defects which an examination ought in the circum-
stances have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course
of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.
As is indicated by the official comments, the general terms with which
subsection (Sa) is concerned, are by ordinary usage "understood to
mean that the buyer takes the entire risk as to the quality of the
goods involved." 00 Subsection (Sa) is in fact a particularization of
subsection (3c).101
09UCC § 2-314(2)(c).
100 UCC § 2-316, official comment 7.
101 Ibid.
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The limitation of the seller's warranty liability is not restricted to
the use of disclaimers or words and phrases indicating that a particular
warranty or all warranties are excluded. The law has long provided
that an inspection of goods by the buyer will relieve the seller of
liability for any defects which should have been discovered by such
inspection.10 2 The Code codifies the existing law by the inclusion of
subsection (Sb) set out above. Like its counterpart in the Sales Act,
this provision modifies any warranties otherwise applicable only to the
extent to which any defects or imperfections in the goods are detect-
able by examination. 0 3 The extent of the exclusion or modification
is determined by the facts surrounding the examination, the means
available, the manner in which it is taken, and the person making the
examination. Latent defects which could not be discovered by such
an examination are not within the provision. 10 4 Since examination by
the buyer indicates that he is relying on his own skill and judgment
and not that of the seller, the inspection rule of exclusion is in accord
with the warranty requirement that there must be reliance.
The buyer is not required to examine all the goods; the provision
is satisfied where he examines a sample or model provided by the
seller for such purpose.10 5 If, however, the buyer refuses to make the
examination after the seller's demand, no implied warranty will arise
as to defects which would have been discovered on the examination. 06
The official comments indicate that there must be an actual demand
on the part of the seller that the buyer examine the goods. The
commentators point out that the availability of the goods for inspection
is not sufficient.'07 It would appear that the view taken by the com-
mentators with respect to the word "refuse" is too stringent. Cer-
tainly, it should suffice for the seller to clearly request that the goods
be examined and offer the goods at the buyer's convenience for
such purpose. A refusal after such a request would indicate the
buyer's intention to waive any implied warranty concerning defects
which would be discoverable upon the examination.
The warranty will not arise after examination where although a
defect is discovered, the buyer continues to use the goods himself or
holds them for resale. The seller is not liable for any injuries caused
102 USA § 15(3), KRS 361.150(3) (1928).
103 Professor Vold explains the diminishing importance of inspection due to
increased specialization and manufacture of highly technical products which often
make examination impractical. Where the sale is of unidentified goods by
description, there can of course be no inspection. Vold, Sales § 89 (2d. ed. 1959).
104 1 Williston, Sales § 234 (rev. ed. 1948); UCO § 2-316, official comment 8.
105 UCC § 2-316, official comment 8.
106 1 Williston, Sales § 234 (rev. ed. 1948); UCC § 2-316(b).
107 UCC § 2-316, official comment 8.
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by such defects; the buyer's own negligence would be the proximate
cause of any injury caused by use of the defective product. 08
Also of special interest is the Code's use of the word "examine
in place of the word "inspect" used by the Sales Act. The former refers
to the nature of the responsibility assumed by the seller at the time
of contracting, since the examination is merely part of the negotiation
made prior to the final transaction.10 9 The word "inspect" referred to
an inspection of goods before acceptance or any other time after the
contract was made.
After the transaction is complete, the warranty is binding and the
seller may not exclude or modify an implied warranty by subsequent
language such as a disclaimer on a sales slip or receipt.110 Professor
Williston indicates that where the buyer has not had an opportunity
to inspect the goods prior to delivery, and then discovers them to be
defective, unmerchantable or unfit for the purpose for which they
were warranted, his acceptance of the goods precludes recovery."'
Where the circumstances do not permit an examination prior to the
acceptance, the buyer, on discovering the defects after acceptance,
must give reasonable notice to the seller or be deprived of a remedy.112
C. Exclusion of the Warranty of Title:
The warranty of title, not being classified as an implied warranty
under the Code, is not subject to the rules of disclaimer under section
2-3 16,113 but is specifically provided for in the section dealing exclu-
sively with the warranty of title and against infringements. Section
2-312 (2) provides as follows:
A warranty under subsection (1) will be excluded or modified only by
specific language or by circumstances which give the buyer reason
to know that the person selling does not claim title in himself or that
he is purporting to sell only such right or title as he or a third person
may have.
Two limitations are recognized, either by specific language or by
circumstances." 4 Both are generally recognized under the Sales Act.115
By specific language, the Code refers to where the seller merely
purports to quitclaim his rights and interest in property, or where he
108 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
110 1 Williston, Sales § 289(c) (rev. ed. 1948).
1I 1 Williston, Sales § 289C (rev. ed. 1948).
112 USA § 49. Essentially the same provision is rewritten but without sub-
stantive change in UCC § 2-607(8) (a).
113 UCC § 2-812, official comment 6.
114 Ibid.
115 See USA § 13)(4), KRS 861.180(3)(4) (1928); 1 Williston, Sales §
219 (rev. ed. 1948).
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states that he does not warrant the title, or where the seller professes
to sell only a limited interest in the goods. The exclusion or modifica-
tion by circumstances which give the buyer reason to know that
title is not warranted has broad application. Neither a sheriff, pawn-
broker, executor or persons of that nature are held to warrant title of
goods sold by them.11 The warranty will not arise where the person
making the purchase knows that the person purporting to sell does
not have title in himself, nor is representing the owner. The Kentucky
Court of Appeals held in Sego v. Lynch' 7 that the purchaser of a car
known to have been stolen is denied the benefit of the warranty of
title. It also stands to reason that purchases from one known to be a
dealer in stolen goods should not give rise to a warranty of title.
The Code fails, as do most authorities, to mention the exclusion
or modification of the warranty against infringement. The only
limitation stated is that where the buyer furnishes exact specifications
which must be followed the seller is indemnified from liability." 8
But the Code does provide for exclusion or modification of the
warranty by the use of the words "unless otherwise agreed"." 90
Express terms in the contract that the seller does not warrant that the
goods will not infringe upon the patents or copyrights of third parties
should certainly be given effect under Code.
D. Cumulation and Conflict of Warranties:
Numerous pre-Sales Act cases in Kentucky held that the presence
of an express warranty excludes the existence of all implied war-
ranties.120 This fundamental misconception was, however, severely
restricted in I. B. Colt Co. v. Asher,12 which held that the presence
of an express warranty excludes only implied warranties which are
necessarily inconsistent. This is the position taken by the Sales Act 122
and affirmed by the Code.123 After adoption of the Sales Act, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals held that an implied warranty was
116 Vold, Sales § 87 (2d. ed. 1959); USA § 13(4), KRS 361.130(4) (1928).
13.7233 Ky. 176, 25 S.W. 2d 353 (1930).
118 UCC § 2-312(3).
119 Ibid.
'-2 0 Guhy v. Nichols & Shepard Co., 33 Ky. L. Rep. 237, 109 S.W. 1190
(1908).
121289 Ky. 235, 39 S.W. (2d) 263 (1931). See also Vandiver v. Wilson,
244 Ky. 601, 51 S.W. 2d 899 (1932), where the court ruled under the Sales Act
that where an express warranty covers the same matter which is ordinarily implied
by law, the implied warranty is deemed to be inconsistent.
'
2 2 USA § 15(6), KRS 361.150(6) (1928) provides:
An express warranty or condition does not negate a warranty or
condition implied under this act unless inconsistant therewith.
123UCC § 2-317(c). Note that the code only provides for displacement of
implied warranties other than the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose which
may be excluded only in writing.
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excludable only where inconsistent with an express warranty or
negated by express language or by implication.124
The Code also provides guides by which the court may determine
the intent of the contracting parties where such inconsistencies arise.
Section 2-317 provides:
Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as con-
sistent with each other and as cumulative, but if such construction is
unreasonable the intention of the parties shall determine which
warranty is dominant. In ascertaining that intention the following
rules apply:
(a) Exact or technical specifications displace an inconsistent sample
or model or general language or description.
(b) A sample from an existing bulk displaces inconsistent general
language of description.
(c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other
than an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
As suggested by the official comments, the theory of cumulative
warranties is that whether express or implied, a warranty represents
the intentions of the parties determined by some conduct on the part
of the seller.'25 Normally, there will be no inconsistency and the
warranties will be held to be cumulative. The comments specifically
point out that the above rules are to be applied only where factors
making for an equitable estoppel of the seller do not exist and the
seller has in good faith obligated himself, not knowing that the war-
ranties are inconsistent. 26  Where the intent of the parties is clear
from the circumstances surrounding the transaction, the court need
not resort to the above rules.
12 7
Abandonment of Privity-Third Party Beneficiary:
Having covered the means by which a warranty obligation arises,
and when and how it may be excluded or modified when so desired,
the next step is to define the extent of the non-disclaimed warranty's
application to whom does the warranty extend? Except in a minority
of jurisdictions which have deviated from the norm,'128 the general
124 Frick Co. v. Wiley, 290 Ky. 665, 162 S.W. 2d 190 (1942).
125 UCC § 2-317, official comment 1.
126 UCC § 2-317, official comment 2.
127 UCC § 2-317, official comment 3. Note the similarity of UCC § 2-317 and
paragraphs (c) and (e) of the Restatement of Contracts § 236. Paragraph (c)
of § 236 considers the situation where the contract contains a general provision
and an inconsistent specific provision. The specific provision is ordinarily held to
qualify the general. And by paragraph (c) the restatement expresses the tradi-
tional view of preferring the hand written or type written term over the incon-
sistent printed term of the contract. Restatement, Contracts § 236 (c) and (e)
(1932).
128 Prosser, Torts § 84, 507 (2d ed. 1955). Prosser relates that about one-
third of the jurisdictions have indicated their willingness to part from the bounds
of privity in cases involving food products.
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proposition is that the warranty extends only to parties to the contract,
to those persons said to be in privity.
12
The privity doctrine, a contractual theory, developed in an era
when the buyer was held to deal at arms length in commercial deal-
ings, and social policy reflected the need for protection of sellers and
manufacturers. °30 Due to the sociological and economic developments
which have resulted in our present specialized and urbanized economy,
the buyer no longer has an equal advantage of bargaining power, and
manufacturers and sellers no longer depend upon such protection.
Thus, social policy has likewise taken a marked reverse in support of
greater consumer protection. The pressures of public policy, recog-
nizing the seller's greater ability of bearing the risk of loss and his
ability to distribute it to the benefited public, weigh heavily upon the
courts in promoting a change which will afford protection to the
ultimate user while at the same time foster improved marketing on
the part of the seller'
3 '
Two problems confront the courts by virtue of the privity doctrine.
The first, which has been designated as the "horizontal" problem, is
concerned with claims by persons other than the buyer against the
buyer's vendor.1 32 For example, in a recent Kentucky case suit was
brought against the seller-dealer of an outboard motor boat by a guest
of the purchaser for personal injuries sustained when the motor
exploded. 3 3 While the owner of the boat was in privity with the
dealer, his guest was not, and in the absence of proving negligence on
the part of the dealer the guest could not recover. The second problem,
referred to as the "verticaF" problem, involves claims of a subvendee
against the manufacturer. This problem would be exemplified in the
factual setting used above13 4 if the owner suffered personal injuries
129 Rochlin v. Libby-Owens Ford Glass Co., 96 F. 2d 597 (2d Cir. 1938)
(shattered shatter proof windshield); Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal 2d
682, 268 P. 2d 1041 (1954) (crop damage caused by "harmless" insecticide);
Hieronymous Motor Co. v. Smith, 241 Ky. 209, 43 S.W. 2d 668 (1931) (per-
formance of new car warranted by manufacturer); Prater v. Campbell, 110 Ky.
23, 60 S.W. 918 (1901) (warranty as to size of standing timber); Chysky v. Drake
Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923) (nail baked in cake).
'30 Prosser, Torts § 84 (2d ed. 1955).
131 Llewellen, Cases and Materials on Sales 340 (1930). See also Traynor, J.,
concurring in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.
2d 436, 440 (1944); Edwards, "Privity; Property Damage; and Personal Injuries
A Reappraisal," 32 Wash. L. Rev. 153 (1937).
132 For further discussion on the Horizontal and Vertical problems, see Note,
"Legislation," 15 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 331, 852 (1953).
133 Coplinger v. Werner, 311 S.W. 2d 201 (Ky. 1958). Guest of buyers
denied recovery against seller-dealer because of no privity; and was denied
recovery against the manufacturer due to inability to sustain burden of proof
in negligence charge, and court refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
134 ibid.
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from the explosion and sought damages for breach of warranty of
merchantability in a direct suit against the manufacturer. Here again,
unless negligence can be proved on the part of the manufacturer
constituting the proximate cause of the accident, the owner will not
recover.
A. Horizontal Problem:
The courts have become particularly aware of the harshness of
privity in warranty cases where the person injured is one who might
reasonably be expected to use the product and suffer injuries if it is
defective. 35 Some courts, under the pressure of public policy, will
temporarily ignore the privity doctrine and allow recovery to the
injured consumer. This has been especially true in food cases.' 36 While
many courts have elected not to abandon the privity doctrine, they
have instead employed various legal fictions to bring the cases within
the rules of privity.137 One such fiction is based on principles of
agency, as where the wife-agent purchases groceries for the husband-
principal who consumes the deleterious food and suffers personal
injuries. The courts have held that the warranty is actually given to
the principal through his agent.13 8 But the rule is limited to cases
where the court can reasonably construe the purchaser as the agent
of the person injured. In view of the limited application of this theory,
some courts rely instead upon a theory that once a warranty has been
given it runs with the goods and the consumer has the benefit of the
original warranty.139 Still other jurisdictions have resorted to a third
135 James, "Products Liability II," 84 Tex. L. Rev. 193 (1955).
136 Prosser states that many courts have permitted recovery by the consumer
injured by unwholesome food against the manufacturer upon a theory not based
upon the intricacies of the law of Sales, but upon public policy. Prosser, Torts § 84
(2d ed. 1955); see Klien v. Duches Sandwich Co., Ltd., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P. 2d
799 (1939) (maggots in cellophane wrapped sandwich); Blanton v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 213 (1944) (canned meat); Kniess v.
Armour & Co., 134 Ohio St. 432, 17 N.E. 2d 734 (1938) (sausages infected with
trichinosis); Catani v. Swift Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95 At. (1915) (deleterious dressed
meat in original package); Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609,
164 S.W. 2d 828 (1942) (poisonous sausages); but see Greenberg v. Lorenz, 7
App. Div. 2d 968, 183 N.Y.S. 2d 46 (1959) (metal fish tag imbedded in canned
salmon).
137 James, "Products Liability I", supra note 135 at 193; 1 Williston, Sales
§ 244, (rev. ed. 1948).
138 Young v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 15 Supp. 1018 (Pa. W. D. 1936) (wife
acting as husband's agent in purchase of preserves containing a mouse); Singer v.
Zabelin, 24 N.Y.S. 962 (1941) (wife purchased diseased canned salmon held to be
agent of husband and not of her daughter). But cf. Russell v. First Nat. Stores Inc.,
79 A. 2d 573 (N.H.1951) (court permitted wife to recover for injuries she
received under warranty of fitness on lamb patties, and held that evi ence was
insufficient to show that she was acting as agent for spouse.)13 9 Williams v. Paducah Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 343 IM. App. 1, 98 N.E. 2d
164 (1951) (warranty runs with goods, but buyer must maintain burden that
(footnote continued on next page)
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party beneficiary theory of extending the warranty obligation to others
than the purchaser when they reasonably expect to use the goods
purchased.1
40
Apparently this latter theory impressed the drafters of the Code.
Section 2-318 provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a
guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may
use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person
by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section.
As a step in the right direction, the Code has extended the warranty
to members of the family or household and to guests in the home. As
further indicated by the last sentence of the section, the seller can not
limit the operation of this section where any warranty exists.
But what of a guest in a car, or boat, or elsewhere, or of other third
persons who may by the nature of the sale be reasonably expected to
be in frequent use or to be affected by the use of the product sold?
The comments explain that the section is neutral in regard to other
situations not specifically mentioned and is dependent upon the de-
veloping case law for further extension.141 This shortcoming has met
with notable criticism from Professor James who indicates his regret
that the more inclusive 1949 draft of the Code had been modified with
respect to the privity question. 142 It provided that the warranty
extends to "[one] whose relationship to him [the buyer] is such as to
make it reasonable to expect that such a person may use, consume or
be affected by the goods. .. 143 The 1957 draft adopted by the Ken-
tucky legislature, however, is couched in the language set forth above
in section 2-318. Perhaps one reason for this limitation is to avoid
the difficult question of determining whether the person claiming the
benefit of the warranty was within the scope of the seller's foresee-
ability.
B. Vertical Problem:
While the Code is criticised for being incomplete in handling the
horizontal problem, it has entirely neglected the vertical problem.
(footnote continued from preceding page)
goods have not been tampered with); Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of
Chicago, 332 M. App. 117, 74 N.E. 2d 162 (1943); (dead mouse in Coca-Cola);
Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873
(1952) (beverage containing house fly.)
14 Mouren v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 139 N.Y.S. 2d 375 (App. Div. 1955);
(warranty to husband purchaser of contaminated beef extends to third party, wife).
141 UCC § 2-318, official comment 3.
142 James, "Products Liability II, supra note 135, 194, n. 9.
148 UCC § 2-318 (1949 Official Draft).
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The Code has simply taken no position as to whether an injured
subvendee should be allowed recourse against one other than his
immediate vendor. This identical problem faced the courts in products
liability cases based on negligence, where for over three quarters of
a century they blindly followed the misconceived case of Winterbotton
v. Wright. 44 However, with the eventual adoption of the MacPher-
son 145 rule, an injured party became entitled to bring a direct suit
against the manufacturer for breach of duty to exercise such care.
14
Absence of privity no longer precludes recovery.
But recovery based on negligence has not proved a sufficient
remedy as specific acts of negligence are often impossible to prove
147
and the courts have shown a reluctance to apply the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur unless the instrumentality was under the control of the
defendant and the circumstances create a clear inference that the
accident would not have happened if the defendant had not been
negligent. 148 Modem authorities are therefore urging a form of strict
liability, where only the existence of the warranty and the fact that
the defective quality of the goods was the proximate cause of the
injury need be proven. 49
Strict adherence to the privity doctrine in breach of warranty suits
brings about a multiplicity of law suits causing unnecessary expense
and delay in the administration of justice.150 For example, an injured
consumer must bring suit against his immediate vendor who in turn
must sue his vendor. Thereafter suit may be brought by the manu-
facturer against his suppliers with liability eventually falling on the
party at actual fault. This leaves the consumer, or any intermediary,
bearing the risk of insolvency of his immediate vendor and being
denied recovery at all.
As pressure from public opinion mounts, forward looking courts
have seized upon other means by which the manufacturer may be
held in a direct suit. Many courts have held the non-negligent
manufacturer liable on a warranty of wholesomeness imposed by
144 10 N. & W. 109, 111 J. Ex. 415 (1842) (a user not contracting directly
with repairman denied the right to bring suit for personal injuries.)
145 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
Kentucky finally adopted the MacPherson rule in C. D. Herme, Inc. v. R. C.
Tway Co., 294 S.W. 2d 534 (Ky. 1956).
146 C. D. Herme, Inc. v. B. C. Tway Co., supra note 145.
14 7 Redlich, Commercial Law, 1959 Ann. Survey of Am. L. 353, 360 (1960).
148 Worsham v. Duke, 220 F. 2d 506 (6th Cir. 1955); J. C. Penney Co. v.
Livingston, 271 S.W. 2d 906 (Ky. 1954).
149 Prosser, Torts H 83, 84 (2d ed. 1955), Void, Sales § 93 (2d ed. 1959);
James, "Products Liability I", supra note 135 at 195.
150 Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, supra note 131 at 440; see
other authorities cited in note 131.
KENrrucKY LAw JouRA, [.
operation of law as a matter of public policy."" And in cases where
the manufacturer advertises his product, some courts have found a
direct contractual relation existing between the manufacturer and the
consumer who relied upon the affirmations so made.15 2 Some courts
have applied the theory of the warranty running with the goods so
that the ultimate consumer is protected by the warranty of the manu-
facturer. 153 Professor James is an advocate of this theory, stating that,
".. . the interest in consumer protection calls for warranties by the
maker that (do) run with the goods, to reach all who are likely to be
hurt by the use of the unfit commodity for a purpose ordinarily to be
expected." 154 While acknowledging some support for the theory of
the warranty running with the goods, Dean Prosser suggests what he
considers a more sound theory of warranty being a form of strict
liability in tort which does not depend upon a contract theory. 55
He points out that this theory is grounded in the historical develop-
ment of the law of warranty in the field of tort liability to which the
courts could justifiably return. Professor Vold, like Prosser, supports a
theory which does not attempt to come within the bounds of privity,
but seeks to limit the rule of privity itself. He takes the position that
the privity doctrine should only apply to promissory warranties, but
not to warranties imposed by law. 156
However, many courts would not consider a theory which would
allow recovery to one not in privity.1'5 Professor Williston, an advocate
of the privity doctrine suggests an "assignment" theory. He explains
that the right which a purchaser acquires under a warranty amounts
15' Foley v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 215 S.W. 2d 314 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1948) (tack swallowed while drinking beverage); Oklahoma Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Dillard, 208 Okl. 126, 253 P. 2d 847 (1953); Jacob E. Decker &
Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d 828 (1942); (poisonous sausages).
Swift & Co. v. Wells, 201 Va. 213, 710 S.E. 2d 203 (1959) (diseased meat). See
cases cited supra note 136.
152 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d
612 (1958); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. 2d 409 (1932).
15 3 Patorgias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, supra note 139; LeBlanc
v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 139; Coca-Cola Bottling Works
v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927) (bottle containing broken glass);
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Ft. Worth v. Smith, 97 S.W. 2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App.
1936) (cockroach in bottle). But see J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Dul-
worth, 216 Ky. 637, 287 S.W. 994 (1925), where the Kentucky court emphatically
rejects any notion of the manufacturer's warrar"-- running with the product.
154 James, "Products Liability II', supra note 135 at 194.
155 Prosser, Torts § 84, 508 (2d ed. 1955), states that the seller's liability
rests upon the responsibility assumed toward the members of the consuming public
who may be injured as a result of marketing the goods.
156 Vold, Sales § 93 (2d ed. 1959).
'57 Greenberg v. Lorenz, 7 App. Div. 2d 968, 183 N.Y.S. 2d 46 (1959). The
court ruled that (where the father purchased and daughter consumed a can of
salmon which contained metal tag, daughter could not recover because of lack of
privity.)
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to a chose in action. A chose in action, unless forbidden by law, is
always assignable. He asserts that the choice secured by the warranty
should be assignable as other choses under general contract law, thus
permitting the warranty of the manufacturer through assignment to
enure the warranty protection to the sub-assignee. 158
As indicated above the Code takes no position in this regard. The
Comments state that ". . . it is not intended to enlarge or restrict the
developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his
buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain."159
It is thought that the drafters intentionally remained neutral on the
question, fearing that to take a definite position might mean the
refusal of many jurisdictions to adopt the Code.
The Code does provide some small measure of relief to the
"vertical" problem by the adoption of the "third party notice" or
"vouching in" requirement in cases where the person to be notified
is answerable over.60 The Code has sought to alleviate some of the
hardships which necessarily follow from the successive suit in which
necessarily follow from the successive suit in which the seller-de-
fendant in the original litigation must bring suit against his vendor
to recoup his damages suffered in the initial suit. In the past the
courts have not considered the determinations of fact made in the
prior litigation res ajudicata to the second,' 1' thus requiring the plain-
tiff in the second suit to present substantially the same proof which
had been presented against him before, and with no assurance that
he will be successful in the subsequent litigation.1 2 The Code's pro-
vision makes the determinations of fact in the original suit binding on
the defendant in the subsequent suit. This occurs, however, only
where he has refused to come in and defend after having received a
reasonable notice of the pending litigation, an offer to him to come in
and defend, and a warning that his refusal to make a defense will
render him bound to any determinations made therein. 63 This section
of the Code is applicable where the original seller is a non-resident
of the state and out of the jurisdiction of the local courts or where
prior case law has not recognized third party defenses within the
court's jurisdiction. The seller in the original suit will be given the
158 1 Williston, Sales § 244 trev. ed. 1948).
159 UCC § 2-318, official comment 3.
'O UCC § 2-607(5).
161 Booth v. Scheer, 105 Kan. 643, 185 Pac. 878 (1919).
1 2 Note, 40 Mich. L. Rev. 872 (1942). See also 3 Williston, Sales § 614A
(rev. ed. 1948). Williston asserts that in a suit for breach of warranty of quality
where notice has been given to a dealer, he will be primae facia liable for con-
sequential damages.
103 UCC § 2-607.
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additional knowledge and ability of his vendor where the vendor has
decided, in protecting his interest, to come in and defend.10 4 Where
the seller, answerable over, has taken over the defense in the original
action he will not later be heard to deny findings made in the
original suit.165 It should be noted that the "vouching in" provision
of section 2-607 is applicable only where the seller is answerable
over,0 6 and, as the comments suggest, the application of the notice
provision is limited to the immediate seller who in turn must still
bring a successive suit to recoup the damages he sustains if he is
not the wrongdoer.
167
What of the developing case law in Kentucky? There are relatively
few decisions which have dealt with the privity rule in warranty cases.
The great bulk of product liability cases, a majority of which concern
deleterious food products,168 are brought under a negligence theory,
where privity is not required.0 9 But in North America Fertilizer v.
Combs170 there is dicta to the effect that the court will recognize an
extension of the privity doctrine in actions based on warranty. The
court stated that a manufacturer may expressly warrant his goods to
the final consumer by affirmations of fact written on the label or
container, and that he may impliedly warrant that the goods are fit
for the ordinary purpose for which they were produced. The court
apparently was making a distinction between warranties which are
of a personal nature, such as the warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose, and warranties which may arise by the nature of the induce-
ment and reliance, such as where the consumer relies on the manu-
facturer's claims in advertising his product.
171
If the court were to follow the above dicta, it would be well
supported by modem thought. The manufacturer's interest in his
product by no means ends with its initial sale to the distributor, but
be must clear the wholesaler's and retailer's shelves in order to market
his product in the future. To accomplish this end he engages in
164 Note, 40 Mich. L. Rev. 872, 882 (1942).
165 Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. First Nat. Bank & T. Co., 281 N.Y. 162, 22
N.E. 2d 824 (1939).
166 Ibid.
167 UGC § 2-607, official comment 5.
168 Note, 23 Ky. LJ. 534 (1935).
169 C. D. Herme, Inc. v. R. C. Tway Co., 294 S.W. 2d 534 (Ky. 1954); and
see Note, 42 Ky. L.J. 273 (1954) which accurately traces the history of manu-
facturers' liability in Kentucky.
170 307 Ky. 869, 212 S.W. 2d 526 (1948) the court denied recovery in direct
suit by consumer against manufacturer based on warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose arising by usage of trade.
171 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d 612
(1958).
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extensive advertising as to the quality and fitness of his products
through the media of radio, television, and the press, extending an
invitation to purchase to the consuming public.1 2 By so placing his
products in the channels of commerce, he warrants them to the con-
sumer to be reasonably safe and fit for the purpose designed. The
resulting strict liability would not be without limits. The manu-
facturer's warranty being defined in terms of the safety of the product
when used in the proper manner should not, however, be extended to
injuries that arise because of improper use or defects which cannot
be traced to the product at the time the article reached the market. 173
to the privity doctrine,174 and in non-food cases there is very little
movement away from the rigid rule. Though most secondary authori-
ties recommend its abandonment, there is still strong authority for its
continued application. Professor Williston, in defense of the doctrine,
relates that there are two reasons justifying the continued application
of the rule. He states that a warranty is a contract of personal in-
demnity, and like insurance, it covers only the insured and not a sub-
purchaser or friend. Secondly, the rights of the buyer arising out of
the warranty are choses in action, and in the absence of a specific
agreement, the seller may not be compelled to assign the chose he
possesses from his vendor. 75 Another reason for the privity rule is
the local merchants are in a better position to handle frivolous claims
which hound them in claim-conscious areas.'70 It is also pointed out
by advocates of the doctrine that since the party at fault is eventually
brought to justice by the successive suits (though not always the case)
there is no cause for change. Even those courts which recognize the
adverse public opinion to the doctrine are generally not willing to
break from the long standing precedent, seeking refuge in the claim
that it is a matter for the legislature.
The modem trend undoubtedly is away from the ancient doctrine,
and the reasons in support of this trend appear to be the most sound.
Today's consumer generally purchases entirely in reliance on the
manufacturer in the case of manufacturer products and on the seller
in the case of produce. The Kentucky court pointed out the harshness
of holding the seller liable in sealed container food cases, but justified
172 Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, supra note 131.
17 Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d 828,
(1942); Swift & Co. v. Wells, 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E. 2d 213 (1959).
As indicated before, the majority of jurisdictions staunchly adhere
174 Prosser, Torts § 84 (2d ed. 1955).
176 1 Williston, Sales § 244 (rev. ed. 1948).
176 Llewellen, Cases and Materials on Sales 343 (1930).
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it as a lesser of two evils, imposing the loss on the seller instead of the
consumer. 177 In such a case the consumer relies on the manufacturer
not the seller, who is a mere conduit of the manufacturer. 78 What
valid reason prohibits an injured consumer from seeking redress
directly from the party at fault? Not only would a direct suit expedite
justice, but it would reduce the risk of judgment proof defendants
which, under present rules, bars all recovery on warranty theory. As
for the manufacturer, he no longer requires the protection and
sympathy of the law. Marketing conditions as they are would
seemingly impose on the manufacturer the responsibility for his
products.179 The manufacturer is in a better position to bear the
burden of injuries of the consuming public, and in turn to pass it on
to the entire public by higher prices. A direct suit, based on strict
liability would tend to foster greater precautions in the manufacture
and design of products.180
Conclusion
In seeking recovery for injuries caused by defective products, the
consumer continues to stumble through a maze of legal doctrines' 8 '
which continue to be applied by most jurisdictions. But the adoption
of the Code has enabled Kentucky to keep abreast with modem trends
in providing for its citizens a comprehensive commercial law. As has
been so elegantly stated by Mr. James B. Young, Chairman of the Ken-
tucky State Bar Association Committee for the Uniform Commercial
Code, "... the Code represents the end result of the best legal minds in
this country.... One of the great advantages of the Code is that it
fills in the blank areas of the law where we have had no decisions or
statutes.' 8 2 These statements are particularly pertinent to the subject
of warranties. The application of the express warranty has been vastly
extended and the warranty of merchantability has been clearly defined,
making it applicable to all sales by merchants unless specifically
,excluded. The troublesome status of the disclaimer has at last been
codified, and initial strides have been taken to alleviate the hardships
.of the archaic privity requirement. Though the Code may not provide
all the answers to the multitude of intricacies which arise in corn-
.77 Martin v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 301 Ky. 429, 192 S.W. 2d 201 (1946)
(dead rat in chile con came).
118 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., supra note 171.
2
7 9 Prosser, Torts § 84 (2d ed. 1955).
180 Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, supra note 131.
181 Redlich, Commercial Law, 1959 Ann. Survey Am. L., supra note 147 at
4357.
182 Young, Scope, Purposes, and Functions of the Uniform Commercial Code,
-48 Ky. L.J. 191 (1960).
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mercial transactions, it will serve as a guide to the court in those
cases which are not within its express provisions. The official comments
will serve as a valuable aid in solving the many problems of interpreta-
tion which will face the court under the new law. Where the case
presented demands a policy consideration on matters not specifically
covered, it is the duty of the court to meet the challenge in a manner
consistent with the new conditions and practices of a changing and
prosperous civilization. 83
K. Sidney Neuman
183 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., supra note 126.
